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The Internal Revenue Code' has fossilized a conception of the

corporation as a "real entity. "2 It generally treats that entity like any other
taxable person, but it presumes that the entity is "the classic profit

maximizer in collective form."' According to the tax law, a corporation

earns its own income and pays its own tax. 4 Treating the corporation as
a real entity serves important practical goals: it eases administration and
allows form to control the tax consequences of many corporate
transactions, thereby improving predictability for taxpayers.
Developments in corporate theory, however, challenge this conception
of the corporation. Accordingly, tax policymakers should reconsider the
Code's real-entity approach. In particular, the Code's model of the
corporation does not accurately describe the multi-functioned, politically
powerful, and internally conflicted publicly held corporations that dominate
the economic landscape. In its treatment of corporate philanthropy, the
Code adopts an anthropomorphic conception of the corporate entity that is
at odds with the profit-maximizing conception prevalent throughout the rest
1. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended [hereinafter
the "Code"].
2. I have borrowed the "real entity" label from the corporate-theory literature. See,
e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton, The New
Economic Theory of the Firm]; William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts"
Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 425-26 (1989) [hereinafter
Bratton, The Nexus of Contracts Corporation];Morton J.Horwitz, Santa ClaraRevisited:
The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173 (1985). David Millon,
Frontiersof Legal Thought I: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Michael
J. Phillips, Reappraisingthe Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1061 (1994);
For purposes of this essay, the important characteristic of the real entity theory of
the corporation is that it treats the corporation as a thing that exists, separate and apart
from the people who make it up. While ethical theorists and corporate law scholars have
defined the attributes of the entity differently, for clarity of analysis, this essay
distinguishes two models of the corporate entity: an anthropomorphic entity, see infraPart
I.B.2.a, and a limited entity, see infra Part I.B.2.b. The aggregate notion of the
corporation, which is implicit in the nexus-of-contracts model, is presented here as the
opposite of the entity model, although conceptions of the corporation fall along a
continuum. See infra Part II.
3. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm, supra note 2, at 1490.
4. All references to corporations are to corporations taxed under subchapter C of the
Code. This essay assumes that integration of the corporate and individual income tax is
not an option, and takes no position on the desirability of an integrated tax. Although
some closely held corporations are taxed under subchapter C, the issues discussed in this
essay are primarily relevant only for widely held corporations.
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of the Code.5 It is also inconsistent with treating the corporation as an
entity that is limited by its purposes and consequently not entitled to the
rights and powers that humans possess. 6 By treating the corporation as a
person who can act charitably, the Code has legitimized the power of
management to spend the shareholders' money for charitable purposes,7
and has undermined the justification for using a tax expenditure model for
the individual charitable deduction.8
Although corporate theory has not entirely resolved the issues that
arise in explaining and analyzing how corporations work and what their
role in society should be, the corporate-law literature has seriously
questioned the formalistic entity theory of the corporation embodied in the
Code. Recent corporate theory has moved away from an entity model
toward an aggregate model of the corporation, which considers the
corporation as its constituent parts. While changing conceptions of the
corporation reflected in corporate theory may not provide sufficient reason
to alter the legal regime for taxing corporations,' at the very least, tax
policymakers should share corporate theorists' inquiries into the nature of
the corporation and consider the normative baggage being carried by the
tax law's model.' 0 The tax law, by unreflectively adhering to the entity
concept, has failed to grapple with the tax relevance of these ideas.
In keeping with recent attempts to remedy tax theory's isolation from2
more general social theory" or from legal theory in related disciplines,'
this essay considers the implications of corporate-law theories about the
nature of the corporation for the tax treatment of corporate philanthropy.
In discussing corporate philanthropy, this essay is concerned with
5. See infra Part I.B.1.
6. See infra Part I.B.2.
7. See infra Part I.B.3.b.

8. See infra Part I.B.3.c.
9. Corporate theory has not produced a complete change in state corporate law,
either. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business
Corporation, 14 CAPDozo L. REv. 261 (1992).
10. Considerations of tax administration, revenue collection and politics often
outweigh theoretical consistency. See, e.g, I.R.C. § 1014 (allowing appreciation in assets
held by decedent to permanently escape income taxation while allowing relatively easy
date-of-death basis determination); I.R.C. § 67 (instituting a 2% floor for deductibility
of certain expenses clearly incurred in the production of income, and thereby encouraging
use of the standard deduction).
11. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001 (1996); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive
Theory and Ta, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861 (1994).
12. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995).
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corporate contributions that are not profit-driven."
Application of
corporate theory to corporate-tax issues can help to illuminate biases that
are hidden behind the Code's veneer of neutrality.
The subject of corporate philanthropy invites this kind of analysis
because the tax law's treatment of corporate philanthropy is so dependent
on treating the corporation as a real entity. Once the real entity notion of
the corporation is relaxed or questioned, the tax law's treatment of
corporate philanthropy is no longer obvious, and the deduction for
corporate giving demands a more explicitly normative explanation. In
addition, because the tax law's legitimation of corporate philanthropy is
largely responsible for the corporate law's acceptance of it,' 4 application
of corporate analysis creates a dynamic relationship that can potentially
improve both the tax law and the corporate law.
This essay is organized as follows: Part I describes the entity model
of the corporation as developed in corporate and ethical theory, showing
how that model is embodied in the Code and how variations in that model
produce different conclusions about the legitimacy of the charitable
contribution deduction for corporations. It discusses some issues that arise
when corporate philanthropy is considered in the context of the entity
theory and how the tax law might respond to those issues.
Part II explains how the nexus-of-contracts conception of the
corporation, applied as an analytical tool, challenges the tax law's
treatment of corporate philanthropy. This more contemporary model of
the corporation deconstructs the corporate entity and suggests the
possibility that taxpayers other than the corporation, such as shareholders,
managers, and employees, might more appropriately claim the charitable
contribution deduction for corporate giving. By reconsidering the taxation
of corporate philanthropy, this essay concludes that the Code, by allowing
a deduction at the corporate level for charitable donations financed from
the corporation's coffers, contains behavioral biases that encourage giving
by corporations rather than by the individuals who make up corporations.
It suggests that changes to current law might better allocate income among
taxpayers, neutralize those biases, and reconcile some concerns of both
corporate and tax policy.

13. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.

14. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text; see also Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Pandora'sBox: ManagerialDiscretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
UCLA L. Rv. 581 (1997).
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I. THE TAX LAW TREATS THE CORPORATION AS A REAL ENTITY

The entity theory is convenient for explaining the charitable deduction
for corporations because, at its most extreme, it allows projection of
human characteristics onto corporate entities and consequently, the
imputation of moral agency 5 onto corporate organizations. If corporations
are just like individuals, then they must have the same capacity for charity
as human persons, and the Code should treat them the same. However,
the Code's invocation of an entity model does not necessarily justify a
charitable deduction for corporations because the entity model, standing
alone, does not imply that corporations are just like people; a particularly
anthropomorphic conception of the corporate entity, which the Code fails
to adopt as a general matter, must underlie any conclusion that a
corporation is a person which can itself be charitable.
A. The Emergence of an Entity Theory
In corporate theory, the conception of the corporation as a "real
entity" that exists separate and apart from the individuals who make it up,
or as an "aggregate" of individuals, has evolved over time. The earliest
conception of the corporation, adopted from British law, was based on a
government "concession" theory that treated the corporation as an entity,
and also solely as a creature of law.' 6 During this period, corporations
received individual charters from the state to carry out particular purposes,
and, consequently, were more clearly identified with the public sector.' 7
After the enactment of general corporation laws, which provided
widespread availability of the corporate form, the state's role weakened.
While some argued that general availability of the corporate form
undermined the entity notion because any group of individuals could
privately create their own corporation, 8 others still viewed the corporation
15. Moral agents can act intentionally and take moral responsibility for their actions.

See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text; see also SHAME,
CORPORATION

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE

4-5 (H. Curtler ed., 1986).

16. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 128-29 (1932).
17. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm, supra note 2, at 1484;
see also Millon, supranote 2, at 206. The public nature of the chartered corporation was
taken for granted and judicial intervention was necessary to protect any private attributes
of corporations. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)

518 (1819).
18. See Horwitz, supranote 2, at 204.
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as an entity.' 9 In the late nineteenth century, there was a debate between
individualists, who adopted a contractual model of the corporation that
treated the corporation as an aggregation of shareholders along the
partnership model, and "corporate realists," who adopted the entity
model.'0 In the early twentieth century, the entity conception seemed to
have triumphed, 2' and much was written about the personality of that
entity, for example, as an organic or inevitable institution. 2
The debate about the nature of the corporation in the scholarly
literature quieted from the 1920s until the 1 9 8 0 s,' during which time
corporate realism, which treated the corporation as a real entity,2 4 was the
dominant paradigm, and the corporation was generally envisioned as a
hierarchical structure with management in power.'
While Berle and
Means can be read to have introduced a contractual concept into the
corporation, 26 the corporation did not lose its real-entity existence in the
literature until economic theories were adopted by corporate-law theories.27
19. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Finn, supra note 2, at 1486;
Millon, supra note 2, at 211 ("The conception of the corporation as an artificial creation
entirely dependent on the state for its powers gradually gave way to the view that
corporations are the natural products of individual initiative and possess powers conferred
by their constituent shareholders.").
20. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm, supranote 2, at 1489-90.
The corporate realists continued to be influential in the scholarly literature through at least
the 1920s. See id. at 1491.
21. See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 214.
22. See id. at 220.
23. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm, supra note 2, at 1490.
24. Corporations were treated as having ontological status, or reality apart from the
people who participated in them.
25. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm, supra note 2, at 1491-94.
26. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 16, at 129-30, 136-38, 207-19. Berle and

Means generally adopted an entity approach. See infra note 99. For a discussion of the
contractual corporation, see infra Part II.
27. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm, supra note 2, at 1492.
The seminal text from the economics literature is Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Its ideas were adopted into the legal literature
by many "law and economics" scholars in the 1980s. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook &
Daniel Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Reinier
Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J.
857 (1984). By the late 1980s, the nexus-of-contracts approach was widely accepted.
Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Foreword: The Debate on ContractualFreedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1408 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser,
The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations:A Comment on Easterbrook and
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Throughout its history, the tax law has taken the legal-person fiction
very literally, adopting as strong a version of the independent corporate
person as any of the corporate theorists.2 8 If Congress has been
ambivalent about treating corporations like people, that ambivalence is
rarely apparent in the Code's provisions for corporations. The corporate
tax is imposed on corporations as independent taxpaying persons,
regardless of who the corporation's shareholders are, or what their
taxpaying ability is,3" even though tax equity is often judged by reference
to a taxpayer's ability to pay.31 Only if corporations are people can they
have their own abilities to pay tax; and it is clear that individuals bear the
ultimate burden of the corporate tax, even though economists do not agree
about who those individuals are.32 Whoever bears the economic burden
of the corporate tax bears it at the corporate rate, regardless of that
person's individual marginal rate, so the corporate tax, by design, is not
related to the taxpaying ability of any of the individuals who might bear
it.
Despite the corporate tax's failure to impose the tax burden based on
ability to pay, the Code continues to adhere to a strict separate entity
treatment for subchapter C corporations. Under this treatment, corporate
and individual income taxes are not integrated, despite the fact that
virtually all tax policy theorists advocate integration,33 and the 1986 Act
Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1449, 1449 (1989).
28. See Arthur W. Machen, CorporatePersonality, 24 HARV. L. REv. 253, 261-62
(1911) (claiming that the corporation is a real and natural entity).
29. This refers to the corporate income tax imposed on corporations that are subject
to subchapter C of the Code.
30. See BORS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1.05[1][a] (6th ed. 1994).
31. See JotHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 153 (Penguin
Classics 1985) (1848) (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS BK. V, CH. II
(1789)); DAVID BRADFORD, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX

REFORM 35-39 (2d ed. 1984); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 31 (3d ed. 1995).
32. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 243-44, 264-69 (5th ed. 1989). Possible bearers include the
shareholders, all holders of capital (corporate and non-corporate), labor and consumers.
33. See, e.g., BRADFORD, supranote 31, at4; ALVIN C. WARREN, JR., AMERICAN
LAW INsT., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT -- REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX

INTEGRATION (1993); Colloquium on Corporate Integration, 47 TAX L. REv. 427-723
(1992). This essay does not purport to defend the corporate income tax, but rather,
accepts it as a fact.
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strengthened the corporate tax,3" which, in the past, taxpayers had
successfully self-integrated, through the use of leverage, for example. The
text of the Code therefore continues to reflect an unflinching legislative
adherence to the concept of separate corporate personhood, suggesting, in
error, that taxing corporations as entities can be part of a system that fairly
distributes the tax burden.35
In addition, the tax law's wholesale adoption of the corporate person
fiction is well illustrated by the current rate schedule applicable to
corporations. Under § 11 of the Code, corporations are subject to
increasing marginal rates of tax, depending on their income. This is a
curious phenomenon, given that the income of a corporate taxpayer is not
related to the taxpaying ability of the people who bear the burden of the
corporate tax.36 Arguments about the desirability and justification for
progressive taxation are simply inapplicable to the income of a
34. See Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Ta Reform Act of 1986: A
State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REV. 839 (1988).
35. Some have argued that the tax on income from capital is an effective way to
increase the Code's progressivity, and operates as a second-best wealth tax. Cf. Alvin
C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tar,
88 HARv. L. REV. 931-46 (1975). This distributional justification for the corporate
income tax obviously depends on the incidence of that tax falling on holders of capital,
a premise that may not hold. Moreover, it is not at all clear that Congress understands
the corporate tax in this way.
Outside the corporate context, the tax law does recognize that some legal entities are
made up of individuals, but has refused to apply any general aggregate notion for widely

held corporations. S corporations, which are taxed as pass-through entities, are limited
to 75 shareholders. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A). Publicly traded partnerships are taxed
as corporations. See I.R.C. § 7704(a). The Code has created a structural division
between C corporations, subject to their own tax, and partnerships, which are taxed as
pass-throughs. Partial pass-through regimes, such as PFICs and personal service
corporations, stand in between.
While courts sometimes ignore the separate existence of a corporation for tax
purposes, those cases bolster the separate entity treatment of widely held corporations by
preventing taxpayers from manipulating the corporate form in closely held entities. For
example, where the court determines that the corporation is simply a vehicle for tax
avoidance, it may disregard the separate existence of the corporation. See BITTKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 30, 1.05[1][a] & 2.07. By ignoring the corporation where there
is ambiguity about where the corporation ends and the shareholders begin, the courts have
strengthened the notion of the corporation as a real and separate entity.
36. The Office of Management and Budget has recognized the uncomfortable fit of
the graduated-rate structure in the corporate tax by designating it a tax expenditure and
quantifying the expenditure by reference to the top corporate rate. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT 44 (fiscal 1996) (estimating revenue loss from the graduated
corporate income tax rate at $4,120,000,000 in 1996).
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corporation; progressive taxation is about the relative distribution of the
tax burden among the individuals who bear that burden.37 The importation
of a graduated-rate structure into the corporate tax implies that there is
declining marginal utility of corporate income, a conclusion that cannot be
reached without identifying the individual circumstances of the people who
would otherwise receive that income. The adoption of that concept into
the corporate tax shows Congress's adherence to the idea that a
corporation is a person when the corporate tax is at issue.
Similarly, the regulations that define corporations for tax
purposes-and
distinguish corporations
from other business
entities-support the conception of the corporation as an entity. For
example, the regulations treat "continuity of life" as a distinguishing
corporate characteristic," an attribute that can only attach to something
that exists. 39 Limited liability is another corporate characteristic under the
regulations, 40 one that Professor Horwitz has argued flows directly from
the entity notion.4'
B. The Entity Theory and the CharitableDeduction
The real-entity model of the corporation embedded in the tax law has
allowed the Code to treat the income of the corporation as belonging to the
entity, rather than to any individual. Accordingly, as long as corporate
income belongs to the entity, charitable contributions from the corporate
coffers may be made by the entity. Conventional analysis would therefore
conclude, as the tax law does, that the corporation is the taxpayer entitled
to the deduction associated with the contribution. In this way, the entity
theory of the corporation adopted by the Code seems to mandate the
charitable deduction for corporations.
There are three problems with this analysis, one internal to the tax law
and the others resulting from the interplay of corporate theory and tax law.
First, as a matter of the Code's internal consistency, the corporate
37. There is significant literature debating progressive taxation. See, e.g., Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
ProgressiveTaxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905 (1987); Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, The
Uneasy Case for Progressive Taation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv 417 (1952); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical
Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. Rv. 465 (1987).
38. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1993).
39. The regulation states: "A corporation ... has a continuing identity which is
detached from the relationship between its stockholders." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)

(1993).
40. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1993).
41. See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 185.
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charitable deduction is incompatible with the Code's general treatment of
the corporation as a purely profit-maximizing entity.42 Second, adoption
of an entity theory for the corporation alone does not establish that
corporations have the moral capacity for charity, which seems to be a
prerequisite for the individual deduction." Therefore, assuming that the
corporation is an entity does not require parallel taxation for corporations
and individuals, and does not necessarily support a charitable contribution
deduction for the entity." Corporations should only be entitled to the
charitable deduction if they can, in fact, act charitably.4" Finally, if the
corporation is to be treated as an entity, the entity's acts must be
distinguished from the individual acts of the people who make up the
corporation. In determining what constitutes legitimate corporate action,
the existence of conflicts among the individuals associated with the
corporation, particularly owners and managers, must be recognized and
addressed.' The tax law has ignored the issues raised by the separation
of ownership and control in large corporations by generally presuming that
corporations are operated in the single-minded pursuit of profit. Thus, the
profit-maximizing, entity notion is problematic, whether analyzing the tax
law from within or without.
1. Inconsistency in the Code
In addition to treating the corporation as an entity, the Code treats that
entity as having certain characteristics. One overwhelming characteristic
is that corporations are operated for profit.47 In fact, the Code essentially
presumes that all expenses incurred by a corporation are expenditures
incurred in the production of income,48 and corporations are therefore
generally spared the burden of proving that their expenditures are, in fact,
connected to their businesses.
Against this presumption stands the corporate charitable deduction,
which uniquely contemplates (and subsidizes) expenditures that are not
42. See infra Part I.B. 1.
43. See infra Part I.B.2.
44. Outside the charitable contribution context, the Code recognizes that the
corporate person is fundamentally different from the individual taxpayer by explicitly
exempting corporations from certain limitations that are applied to individuals. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 183, 465, 469.
45. See infra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Part I.B.3.
47. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1993) (providing that all organizations taxed
as corporations must have "an objective to carry on business and divide the gains

therefrom").
48. See BITKER & EUsTIcE, supra note 30, 5.03[1].
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profit-maximizing for the corporation. Of course, some expenditures that
are commonly called corporate philanthropy are, in fact, profit-oriented,
and they fit well within the Code's approach to taxing corporations. Those
expenditures are not the subject of this paper.49

Some corporate philanthropy is not profit-oriented, 0 or at least, we

must assume that it is not5" in order to consider fully the legal regime that
permits corporate philanthropy and the deduction allowed for it. Because
the statutory structure of both state and federal law are so clear, it is
important to consider the implications of corporate giving that is not profitmaximizing: the state statutes expressly permit such giving 52 and the Code
clearly contemplates, even encourages, it. 3 Thus, there is explicit
authority and significant incentive for corporations to make profit-reducing
expenditures to charity. From the simple perspective of statutory
coherence, allowance of a charitable deduction for any profit-reducing
expense undermines the Code's broader approach to corporations because
49. The issues raised by profit-maximizing philanthropy and wealth-reducing
philanthropy are somewhat different, so it is useful to analyze these two types of
corporate expenditures independently of one another. Professor Knauer has thoroughly
examined the tax implications of profit-maximizing corporate philanthropy. See Nancy
J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the
Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1994).
50. See Jayne W. Barnard, CorporatePhilanthropy:Executives' Pet Charitiesand
the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rnv. _ (1997). See also James R. Boatsman
& Sanjay Gupta, Taes and Corporate Charity: Empirical Evidence from Micro-Level
Panel Data,49 NAT'L TAx J. 193 (1996) (data on corporate philanthropy consistent with
managers' utility maximization rather than profit maximization); Bill Shaw & Frederick
R. Post, A MoralBasisfor CorporatePhilanthropy, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 745, 747-48 (1993)
(concluding that the empirical evidence suggests that corporate giving is primarily
motivated by citizenship interests).
51. Some would argue that profit-maximizing philanthropy is not properly regarded
as philanthropy at all. See David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1979). This essay takes no position in the
definitional debate.
52. See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 122(9) (1991) ("Every corporation.., shall
have power to ... [m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific
or educational purposes"); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a)(12) (1986) ("Each corporation
... shall have power ... [t]o make donations, irrespective of corporate benefit, for the
public welfare or for community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, civic or similar
purposes") (emphasis added).
53. Section 170's corporate deduction would otherwise be superfluous because
corporate philanthropy would be deductible under I.R.C. § 162. Where donations to
charity are in the nature of capital expenditures, a deduction under I.R.C. § 170 is more
advantageous than a business deduction, which would be deferred by I.R.C. §§ 263 and
263A.

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

it is inconsistent with the Code's overall profit-oriented presumption
applicable to corporations."
2. Corporations and Charitable Intent
While there is some debate about what requirements a donor must
satisfy to claim the charitable-contribution deduction,55 two of the three
tests that courts have applied require some discernible intent on the part
of the donor, and the entity theory of the corporation does not
automatically imbue the corporation with the capacity to have any
charitable intent of its own. The three tests, each of which has been
offered as the interpretation of a single statutory provision, can be
summarized as follows: (1) the donor makes a qualifying contribution or
gift as long as she receives no direct quid pro quo for her transfer; 6 (2)
the donor makes a qualifying contribution or gift if she receives no quid
pro quo for her transfer and has no expectation of any return benefit;5 7 and
(3) the donor makes a qualifying contribution or gift if she receives no
quid pro quo and makes her transfer out of detached and disinterested
generosity. 8
The first is the only test that can be analyzed purely objectively, while
the other two tests have varying levels of subjective inquiry. The
requirements of "detached and disinterested" generosity and lack of a quid
pro quo dictate that business transfers and charitable transfers be
separable.5 9 Profit-maximizing philanthropy would fail to satisfy any of
the three tests because it involves an economic return to the donor.6 ° For
54. Part I.B.3 discusses some of the implications of this presumption.

55. These requirements are an interpretation of the "contribution or gift" requirement
in I.R.C. § 170, and therefore, apply to all taxpayers claiming charitable deductions.
56. See Crosby Valve and Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.
1967).
57. See Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
58. See DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
59. See I.R.C. § 162(b) (disallowing business deduction for charitable gifts, and
thereby requiring particular expenditure to be placed within § 162 or § 170). The two
intent tests require courts to distinguish business motives from charitable motives. See
Rusoff v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 459 (1979) (deduction disallowed where transfer of
property not accompanied by donative intent and taxpayer had expectation of

"astronomical profits" that never materialized).
60. The law does not require that the quid pro quo come directly from the charitable
recipient. See Singer, 449 F.2d at 423-24 (no deduction allowed for donation of sewing
machines to schools because donations were intended to induce students to buy Singer
machines); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,877 (Aug.27, 1992) (deduction disallowed where
corporation donated to charities selected by employees, and employees, in exchange,
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purposes of this essay, the third test, which clearly requires emotive
capacity on the part of the donor, is assumed to apply because it is the
most consistent with the body of cases concerning the charitable deduction,
and it is necessary to prevent the deduction from applying in cases in
which transfers are clearly not charitable, such as in the case of "bad
bargains" in sales of property, and fines paid to exempt organizations. 6
Even without such an assumption, I contend, in Part 2b below, that the
entity theory provides a weak justification for the corporate charitable
deduction.

a. The Anthropomorphic Corporation
The corporate entity concept does not demand that any particular
human characteristics be projected onto the corporation. Therefore, within
the confines of the entity concept, the tax law is left to personify the entity
to various degrees. The Code seems to reflect the choice to give
corporations the human capacity for altruism by allowing them a charitable
deduction in the context of a statute that recognizes charitable motives.
On the other hand, the tax law has refused to allow corporations the
human capacity for consumption by generally recharacterizing corporate
consumption expenditures as consumption that is taxable to individuals. 62
donated to PAC supporting corporation's candidates).
61. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this essay. For further
discussion see Richard D. Hobbet, CharitableContributions-- How CharitableMust They
Be?, 11 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1980) (both arguing that the detached and disinterested
requirement is a necessary part of the statute); Joseph V. Sliskovich, Charitable
Contributionsor Gifts: A ContemporaneousLook Back to the Future, 57 UMKC L. REV.
437, 486 (1989). But see James W. Colliton, The Meaning of 'Contribution or Gift'for
CharitableContributionDeduction Purposes, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 973 (1980) (arguing that
there should not be any motive requirement); Knauer, supranote 49, at 39 (implying that
the subjective element has been rejected by the Supreme Court).
62. Consumption-type expenditures financed by corporate payments are generally
recharacterized as the taxable consumption of individual shareholders or employees. See,
e.g., Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929) (excessive payments
to corporate directors not deductible as business expenses, but characterized as profit
distributions); P.R. Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1987)
(gratuitous payments to third party characterized as constructive dividends); Inland
Asphalt Co. v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (corporate payments of
shareholder's personal tax liability were constructive dividend); Jack's Maintenance
Contractors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 703 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1983) (corporate payments
for shareholder's criminal defense were constructive dividends). For the rent free use of
a corporation's apartment see Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951);
Chandler v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940), affd 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941);
Reynard Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934); Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30
B.T.A. 449 (1934); Dean v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 256 (1947).
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The strongest theoretical support for the altruistic capacity of
corporations, and justification for the deduction that subsidizes altruistic
actions, can be drawn from the work of the ethicist Peter French,6 3 who

contends that "corporations can be full-fledged moral persons [with]
whatever 6privileges, rights and duties are . . . accorded to moral
persons." In his view, moral personhood requires the abilities to engage
in intentional decision-making and to change conduct in response to moral
criticism, and he suggests that corporations can do these things. 65 If they
can, then they can act intentionally in the same way that humans act
intentionally6 6 and, therefore, it follows that they can have the intent to be
63. See also Paul B. Thompson, Why Do We Need a Theory of Corporate
Responsibility?, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 15, at
113 (explaining and defending French's position).
64. Peter A. French, The Corporationas a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207
(1979).
65. See id. at 213-14; PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 166 (1984). Ethicists disagree about whether behaving intentionally and
responding to moral evaluation are sufficient conditions for moral personhood. See
Thomas Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontology: The French Way, in SHAME,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 15, at 99, 108-09 (arguing that the
ability to sympathize with others is a necessary condition for moral personhood).
The philosophical literature about the personhood of corporations has focused, to
some extent, on the specific question of responsibility for harm and the problem of
punishment. Whether corporations can have the intent to cause harm is a crucial part of
that inquiry, and that is why this literature is relevant to the subject at hand: corporations
need the capacity for charitable intent in order to be charitable. Some of the literature
on harm has explicitly related the analysis to social good. See Richard T. DeGeorge,
Corporations and Morality, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra
note 15, at 57, 71.
The legal implications of corporate personhood, beyond the treatment of corporate
philanthropy and criminal liability, should not be overlooked. If corporations are just like
humans, then they not only have the capacity for charity, but they should have all the
rights that other people have under the law as well. Treating corporations as persons
affects the relative power of corporations and individuals in society. See John Ladd,
Persons and Responsibility: Ethical Concepts and Impertinent Analogies, in SHAME,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 15, at 87 ("Some of the legal
consequences of taking corporations to be persons are, it seems to me, morally
objectionable. They may be summed up in the legal doctrine that a corporation is a
person within the protection of the 14th amendment."); Donaldson, supra, at 102;
DeGeorge, supra, at 61.
66. See Peter A. French, Principlesof Responsibility, Shame, and the Corporation,
in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 15, at 19-21.
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charitable; giving because of commitment67 that reduces their well-being.68
As long as the corporation has its own income and gives it away with
generous motives, then the charitable contribution deduction is appropriate
for the corporate entity because the corporation is the taxpayer who
satisfies both the economic and motive requirements for charitable
giving.69
b. The Limited Corporate Entity
Peter French's critics have disputed the capacity of organizations to act
as he describes."0 Thomas Donaldson has pointed out that corporations
have no "heart. "71 John Ladd has argued that French's extension of
personhood to corporations "reduces
the ethical content of 'person' and
'responsibility' virtually to zero." 72 Some have claimed that nobody is
67. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations
of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1970) (describing commitment as nonutility maximizing behavior of people).
68. This description of charitable intent borrows from the literature concerning
individual giving. Some have argued that all charitable giving is essentially consumption,
which is utility maximizing, implying that there is no uniquely charitable intent. See
Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"
Income Ta and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV.
831, 845-54 (1979). Others have considered the possibility of altruism. See Mark P.
Gergen, The Case For a CharitableContributionsDeduction, 74 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1442
(1988) (evaluating the equitable arguments for the charitable deduction by looking to
whether the contribution is "self-abnegating" or welfare-reducing for the donor); see also
Engel, supra note 51, at 59 ("the distinctive trait of altruism is that the giver's lot is
depreciated -- by his or her own voluntary act").
69. While he did not discuss the moral-person issues of concern to Peter French, it
is possible to interpret E. Merrick Dodd's use of an entity theory to argue for corporate
philanthropy as adopting an anthropomorphic conception of the corporation. See E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv.
1145, 1160-61 (1932).
If we think of [the corporation] as an institution which differs in the nature of
things from the individuals who compose it, we may then readily conceive of
it as a person, which like other persons engaged in business, is affected not
only by the laws which regulate business but by the attitude of public and
business opinion as to the social obligations of business. Id.
70. See, e.g., DeGeorge, supranote 65, at 62 (Human beings have emotions which
should not be treated as the emotions of the corporation because to do so "stretches our
normal use of language beyond recognition."); Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations
are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J., Spring
1983, at 7.
71. Donaldson, supra note 65, at 109.
72. Ladd, supra note 65, at 77-79.
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responsible when bureaucracies act, 73 and others have argued for a revised
conception of individual responsibility in the organizational setting to
ensure that individuals are responsible for corporate acts.74 Ladd stated,
"In the final analysis . . . the only way to bring corporations under the
scope of morality is to identify what they do (corporate actions) in one
way or another
with what individual human beings connected with them
75
. . . do."

Some philosophers have chosen a middle ground between French's
view that groups are full moral persons in their own right, and the view
of those who claim that groups do not exist as independent actors at all.76
"A middle position is developed in which social groups are conceived as
individuals in relationships[,] . . . when there is action or intent that
occurs in the group which could not occur outside of the group." 77 Larry
May believes that this middle ground is better supported by psychological
and sociological evidence than either of the more extreme views.78 Any
notion of moral agency in the corporation that relies on individuals reflects
a much weaker anthropomorphization of the corporate entity than
contemplated by French, even though the corporation can still be
conceived, for some purposes, as an entity that exists independent of any
individual participants; it is simply a more limited entity.
These theorists, who have concluded that corporations have some
restricted existence, characterize corporations as means to ends, while
73. See David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90
MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2359 (1992) (citing HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 38-39
(1970)).
74. See id. at 2382-90; Ladd, supra note 65, at 91.
75. Ladd, supra note 65, at 91.
76. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
77.

LARRY MAY,

THE MORALITY OF GROUPS:

COLLECTIvE RESPONSIBILITY,

GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 5 (1987). Some would say that French

himself has moderated his position since he wrote The Corporation as a Moral Person.
See Donaldson, supra note 65, at 101.
78. Although May explicitly states that he adopts a middle view, his ideas are much

closer to French's than many of the other theorists who seem to adopt a conception of a
limited entity. May treats groups (including corporations) as existing only to the extent
a collection of individuals have "common interests," which suggests a limited conception.
MAY, supra note 77, at 10. At the same time, he believes that the corporate entity makes
decisions when corporate decision-making procedures "change and combine the intentions
among . . . individuals" in a way that "cannot be fully explained by reference to the
intentions of individual, isolated people." Id. at 66. In this way, he gives the
corporation a great deal of independence from the individuals who make it up.
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human persons are ends in themselves. 79 As means, corporations are
established for limited purposes,8" and the theme of common purpose
seems to be the guiding principle for determining the boundaries of this
conception of a corporate entity. Ladd has defined the sphere of corporate
activity (as distinguished from individual activity) as only those actions
that are within the stated goals of the corporation. 8 '
Some legal thinkers have adopted this philosophical approach in
describing the corporation as an entity with a limited and artificial
construction: "The firm, like other institutions, retains a meaningful
existence as a separate entity because it carries on while individuals, with
their narrower interests and whims, come and go. This reified entity
receives separate substantive content from the 'common purpose' of its
participants. " 82 Like the more anthropomorphic entity notion, this limitedentity concept allows for some independent action on the part of the
corporation. Since corporations possess legal rights and obligations,
recognition of legal personhood for corporations is instrumental, even if
corporations lack moral personhood.
The limited-entity concept recognizes that there are actions that are
best characterized as actions of corporations, while recognizing that
individuals are necessary at every stage of corporate activity. If, for
example, a corporation is organized to provide certain goods or services
in the most efficient manner possible, then the corporation itself can take
action in pursuing those goals, in a theoretical as well as a legal sense, and
can be held responsible for wrongdoing committed in that pursuit.
Corporate criminal liability seems to follow this model.8 3
79. See DeGeorge, supra note 65, at 62-63; Ladd, supra note 65, at 94 (citing
Kant's categorical imperative).

80. See DeGeorge, supra note 65, at 62.
81. John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54

MONIST 488, 493-97 (1970) ("The decisions are made for the organization, with a view
to its objectives and not on the basis of the personal interests or convictions of the
individual official who makes the decision. This is the theory of organizational decisionmaking.").
82. Bratton, The Nexus of Contracts Corporation,supranote 2, at 425-26 (footnotes

omitted). In the philosophy literature, "reification" means the attribution of reality to
something that exists only in the mind, as opposed to "ontological," which means that
something really exists.

See SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION, supra

note 15, at 15.
83. Corporations can be held criminally liable for acts of employees that are within
the scope of their employment, see NewYork Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909), and that they perform with the intent to benefit the
corporation, see United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991). For
crimes that require a certain mental state, a corporation can be held liable if any agent had
the requisite mental state, even if the person with the intent is very low in the corporate
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Nevertheless, a concept of limited corporate personhood that respects
the separateness of the corporation in certain spheres, while rejecting the
conclusion that corporations have all the attributes of individuals, provides
less support than French's personification for the notion of a charitable
corporation and the consequent deduction for corporate giving. Many of
the socially responsible activities of corporations fit nicely within the
common-purpose rubric, and can therefore be considered to be actions of
the corporate entity, even where the corporation is conceived as a limited
construction. However, under this limited-entity view, beyond the
common purpose of the corporation's participants, the corporation's acts
are not its own. 84 This is where corporate philanthropy, as opposed to
corporate criminal liability and profit-oriented social responsibility,
becomes problematic as a theoretical matter, even though it may be
permitted as a legal matter.
Treating employees well, refusing to pollute the environment in the
community in which the business is located, and assuring consumer
satisfaction and safety are all examples of corporate social responsibility
that may fit under the corporate-entity umbrella as actions of the entity,
even under a limited theoretical construction. But these examples of
corporate citizenship may be incomparable to corporate philanthropy in the
sense described here, which is definitionally wealth-reducing, 8 6 and
therefore, cannot be related to the aims of the business. To the extent that
corporate philanthropy is not advertising and does not otherwise inure to
the benefit of the business-i.e., the kind of philanthropy contemplated by
§ 170-any connection to corporate purpose is tenuous.8,7
hierarchy. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660
(2d Cir. 1989).
84. [A]ny considerations that are not related to the aims or goals of the
organization are automatically excluded as irrelevant to the
organizational decision-making process... [Diecisions and actions
of individual officers that are unrelatedto the organization'saims or
goals are construed, instead, as actions of those individuals rather
than of the organization.... [T]he concept of a social decision or

action is bound up logically with the notion of an organizational aim.
The consequence of this co-implication of action and aim is that the

notion of an action or decision taken by an organization that is not
related to one of its aims makes no sense.
Ladd, supranote 81, at 496-97 (emphasis added).

85. There is some ambiguity in the meaning of "corporate social responsibility."
See Engel, supra note 51, at 3.
86. See supranotes 49-54 and accompanying text.

87. Some corporations, under state law, have as their purpose the provision of
charity. These corporations are not taxed under subchapter C of the Code, and are not

the subject of this paper.
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Assuming that corporate philanthropy is wealth-reducing for the
corporation, the limited-entity notion cannot justify it, 88 even though the
income of the corporation given away is appropriately taxed to the entity
under the model. This is so because the limited corporation cannot look
to the common purpose of its participants to resolve: (1) a conflict between
the goals of producing good for society and profits for shareholders;8 9 and
(2) a conflict between competing charitable recipients and their distinct
conceptions of social good.
Despite these shortcomings, some who have argued for corporate
philanthropy seem to have adopted this more limited conception of the
corporate entity,' suggesting the possibility of a generous corporation
without treating the corporation like a human person. This approach
requires the projection of generosity onto the corporation. Some rely upon
the "moral conscience" of the shareholders to give legitimacy to the
actions taken by the managers on behalf of the corporate entity, 9' and
others argue that corporations can be morally responsible by allowing
managers to project their own values onto the corporation. 92 While turning
to the shareholders may be feasible if the corporation is small, or if a
matter is closely related to the shareholder's interest as a shareholder, it
is absurd to talk about a "collective moral conscience" of the shareholders
of a publicly traded corporation, who are not only numerous, but
geographically, religiously, and politically diverse.93 There can be no
collective charitable choices made on behalf of the corporation that satisfy
88. Richard DeGeorge treats the limited nature of corporations as an explanation for
why charity is inapplicable to corporations. DeGeorge, supra note 65, at 62.
89. This is a conflict that arises in other contexts as well. See Allen, supra note 9,
at 275.
90. See Shaw & Post, supra note 50, at 745; Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B.
Matthews, Jr., Can a CorporationHave a Conscience?, 60 HARV. Bus. REv. 132, 139
(1982).
91. Shaw & Post, supra note 50, at 747 ("[lIt is essential that corporate
management, acting for the collective moral conscience of the corporate stakeholders,
seize the leadership in advancing 'the greatest good for the greatest number'").
92. See Goodpaster & Matthews, supra note 90, at 139.
93. In addition to adopting the limited-entity conception of the corporation, Shaw and
Post also adopt a utilitarian ethic as the conception of the good that the corporation should
be active in bringing about. The simple adoption of a utilitarian ethic, even aside from
the necessarily controversial assignment of utility values to various states of affairs, is
likely to be repugnant to a significant number of shareholders, who may adopt some other
theory of justice. For example, a Rawlsian shareholder may prefer that the most good
is provided to the least well off members of society, while a Nozickian shareholder may

prefer that corporations refrain from any redistributive activities. See ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149-64 (1974) (describing the "entitlement theory"); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-80 (1971) (describing the "difference principle").

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41

the parameter of collective shareholder moral conscience, and therefore,
the limited-entity model fails to justify corporate giving if it relies on a
collective moral conscience in which all shareholders join.
Whether projecting from shareholders or managers, the decisional
agency of identifiable individuals becomes part of the corporation's
operating mechanism in the limited-entity conception of the corporation.
Therefore, unlike the anthropomorphic corporation, the limited-entity
model does not itself imply that the corporation should be entitled to a
deduction for such giving for tax purposes; a connection between the
individuals and the corporation must be established, and additionally, the
corporation must be chosen as the proper taxpayer. If the guiding force
of individuals is recognized as an integral part of corporate philanthropy,
and there is no link that connects the action of that individual to the
corporation, 94 then the Code must inquire whether the relevant taxpayer is
that individual. 95 If the charitable intent is personal to the managers, and
the money comes out of the corporation's residual earnings, then there is
no taxpayer-corporate or individual-who satisfies both the economic and
intent prongs of the deduction provision, and a complete disallowance of
the deduction might be appropriate.96
In addition, if the gift is not connected to the common purpose of the
corporation, then, as an economic matter, it must come out of the residual
profits of the corporation. While use of the residual profits within the
corporate business may keep them tied to the corporate entity, thereby
legitimating any use to which the corporation puts them, once they are
paid out of the corporation, the shareholders' interests are affected since
shareholders are ordinarily entitled to distributed residual profits. On this
analysis, the limited-entity corporation fails to satisfy even the economic
requirement for the deduction. Because failure to connect philanthropy
with corporate purpose places corporate giving outside the defined
parameters of corporate acts, it is thus possible to see corporate
philanthropy as dividends foregone by the shareholders, even where there
is some respect for the separateness of the corporation.
For these reasons, application of the limited-entity concept of the
corporation to the tax law fits best with limiting deductibility of corporate
giving to activities connected with the business of the corporation. But the
tax law's adherence to this image of the corporation and of corporate
charitable giving would make § 170's inclusion of corporations
94. This is what distinguishes the corporate criminal liability issue from the corporate
philanthropy issue, as well as distinguishing among different aspects of corporate social
responsibility.

95. Resolution of this issue follows the same analysis as the nexus-of-contracts
challenge. See infra Part II.

96. See infra note 177.
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inappropriate, because all legitimate corporate philanthropy would fit
within the business deduction of § 162. 9" No provision would be
necessary to govern non-business related corporate giving.98 The limitedentity notion fails to identify the corporation as the taxpayer entitled to
claim a deduction for corporate giving. Thus, it makes clear that a
limited-entity model is insufficient, and an anthropomorphic entity concept
is necessary to give corporations the characteristics necessary to rationalize
the corporate charitable deduction in its current form.
3. The Code's Role in Exacerbating the Conflict Between Managers and
Shareholders
In addition to the problem of corporate intent just described, adoption
of a limited-entity model in which individual judgments are acknowledged
creates difficulties for that model that are absent in the anthropomorphic
model of the corporation. Once it is recognized that the generous impulses
of individuals may be fulfilled by the disbursement of corporate funds,
tensions between distinct corporate constituencies are highlighted. This is
particularly true in the case of the large, modern corporation, which can
be seen as a hierarchical entity in which management holds all the power.99
The legitimation of managerial power, independent of shareholder action,
solidified the entity theory of the corporation, but also undermined the
notion that the corporation simply embodied the unanimous will of the
shareholders.' 00 The shareholders were thereby transformed into passive
investors. While creating certain efficiencies, this structure of the
97. The immediate deductibility of charitable giving, as for any business expense,
would be limited by the capitalization rules of I.R.C. §§ 263 and 263A.
98. See Knauer, supranote 49, at 10; see generally Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb,
Rationaland Extra-RationalMotivationsfor CorporateGiving ComplementingEconomic

Theory with Organization Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1035 (1997).
99. See BERLE & MEANS, supranote 16, at 124. While Berle and Means recognized
certain contractual aspects of the corporation, their focus on the disempowerment of
shareholders and the centralization of power in managers is more consistent with an entity

theory of the corporation: "What we have here been observing is the corporation in
transition. From a tight organization analogous to an overgrown partnership it has
emerged into a tremendous unit whose major preoccupation is distinctly not with the

interests of its shareholders." Id. at 152.
100. Changes in state corporate law that allowed fundamental corporate changes
without shareholder unanimity presented one of the greatest challenges to the theory of
the corporation, and seemed to support the entity theory in the late nineteenth century.
See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 202. However, rejection of unanimity can also be

consistent with the aggregate notion of the corporation where it is understood as a method
for reducing transaction costs.
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corporation tempted managers to use their control in their own interests,
rather than in the interests of the investors whose capital they managed.
a. The Code Privileges Corporate Philanthropy Compared to
Shareholder Philanthropy

In adopting the charitable contribution deduction for corporations,
Congress ignored these tensions, despite their prior exposition by Berle
and Means.' By instituting an incentive for the corporate entity to give
away the residual profits of the corporation,' the 1935 Congress
explicitly legitimated the power of corporate management to reduce
corporate wealth. In fact, because of the classical system of corporate
taxation, which taxes corporate income to the entity and again on its
distribution to shareholders, the charitable deduction for corporations
created a preference for corporate giving over individual shareholder
giving.' 0 3
101. It has been claimed that the 1918 Congress, which considered and rejected a
deduction for corporate philanthropy, was concerned about the conflict between
shareholders and managers. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Discretion of Corporate
Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain -- A Survey of, and
Comment on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CANADA-U.S. L.J. 7, 60 (1988). The
legislative history, however, does not support such a reading. When Congress argued
about corporations "breaking a law in order to give away some other person's money,"
it was concerned about the ultra vires nature of corporate giving and the taxpayers'
subsidy of deductible giving. There is no indication that the 1918 Congress believed that
the managers gave away the shareholders' money without their consent, particularly
because the debate enumerates three methods of corporate giving, each of which required
some affirmative act on the part of the shareholders. See 56 CONG. REc. 10,427-28
(1918). The Red Cross dividend program, which was initiated during World War I, and
with which Congress was likely to be familiar in 1918, required shareholder authorization
for corporate gifts. See Knauer, supra note 49, at 18. Therefore, it did not raise the
issue of conflict between managers and shareholders raised by manager-controlled
contributions.
102. In describing the powers of managers to route corporate earnings, nothing that
Berle and Means described rises to the level of giving them away. See BERLE & MEANS,
supra note 16, at 189-206.
103. In the simplest case, the deduction at the corporate level allows the charitable
gift to be larger, by an amount in proportion to the tax rate that applies to the
corporation, than a gift that could be made after a distribution of the same earnings to the
shareholders. For example, if the corporation has $100 cash (tax-paid) to devote to
philanthropy and is in the 35% tax bracket, then it can make a gift to charity of $154,
with the extra $54 financed by the tax savings attributable to the deduction. On the other
hand, if the corporation takes the $100 and distributes it to its shareholders, then the
corporation may not claim a deduction, so the distribution is limited to the $100 available
funds. If the corporation has a sole shareholder in the 40% tax bracket, then the
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This preference for corporate philanthropy is particularly significant
because the tax law, and not state corporate law, established the normative
basis for corporate philanthropy. When Congress adopted the charitable
contribution deduction for corporations, charitable giving was still ultra
vires in most states, and therefore usually prohibited, as a matter of state
corporate law. 1°4 The states followed the tax law's lead in authorizing
corporate giving," 5 and to this day, the state law standards for corporate
giving are still principally constructed on the basis of the tax law
definitions. 0 6 Therefore, the Code's subsidy for corporate giving must be
recognized as the most important legitimating factor for corporate
philanthropy.10 7
If that legitimation is grounded in the assumption that the corporation
is a limited-entity entitled to its own deductions, then it is on shaky ground
in light of the fact that the deduction is for an expenditure that has no
integral connection to any common purpose that defines the entity's
parameters. 0 8 By authorizing corporations to deduct their charitable
contributions, the tax law was operating on the realist vision without
contending with the internal conflicts.
Today, even more than in 1935,
shareholder must pay $40 tax on the distribution.

If, however, the shareholder

contributes the dividend to charity, then the tax at the shareholder level disappears
because the shareholder is entitled to a deduction that fully offsets the inclusion of the
dividend, and can therefore contribute the entire $100 in cash. Thus, without affecting
the residual earnings of the corporation available to the shareholders, the decision to make
a contribution at the corporate level increases the gift by $54, which is wholly taxfinanced, as compared to the gift at the shareholder level.
104. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 594-609 (discussing early state laws governing
corporate philanthropy).

105. Some of the early state statutes either referred to the Code or parroted its
language. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §25-211(b) (Burns Supp. 1951).
106. The leading Delaware case, Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d
398 (Del. Ch. 1969), which established that corporate contributions have to be reasonable

in both amount and purpose, looked to the Code's percentage limitations and qualifying
recipients to decide what is reasonable.

107. See Note, Act 69: CharitableDonationsby Corporations,5 ARK. L. REv. 389,
390 (1952) (stating that "The obvious purpose of [the new Arkansas statute allowing

corporate giving] is to enable Arkansas corporations to take advantage of the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code").
108. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
109. The corporate deduction was adopted shortly after E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. wrote

his article contending that corporations should be socially responsible, so it ispossible that
Congress was responding to this development, and adopting Dodd's position. Professor

Knauer interprets the legislative history that way. See Knauer, supranote 49, at 28-29.
By treating the managers as agents of the corporate entity, rather than agents of the
shareholders, Dodd argued that the managers could act for the benefit of constituencies
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the question of corporate philanthropy, even by a corporate "entity," is
inextricably tied to the separation of ownership and control because
corporate giving is primarily the domain of large corporations." t0
b. The Code Legitimates the Power of Management
The Code has perpetuated the idea that managers can be considered to
be carrying out the corporate agenda without conflict,"' by adopting the
assumption that corporations are operated solely for profit. That
assumption implies that corporations only make expenditures in the
production of income." 2 In other words, the Code presumes that
management operates the corporation in the interest of the shareholders-a
presumption that makes the classic conflict between managers and
shareholders disappear. The existence of this presumption bolsters the
legitimacy of all expenses that are explicitly deductible. Therefore, the
statutory provision authorizing the charitable deduction implies that
management's choices about corporate philanthropy are part of the
corporation's trade or business, despite the fact that they are allowed to be
wealth-reducing for the corporation. Thus, in addition to the Code's
internal inconsistency in including the corporate deduction in a scheme that
generally denies corporations the capacity to make wealth-reducing
other than shareholders. See Dodd, supra note 69. Adolf Berle responded that managers
would thereby be virtually unaccountable in their "absolute powers." See Adolf A.
Berle, Jr., CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1931);
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagers are Trustees: a Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932).
110.
Less than a quarter of the 2.2 million companies make any
contribution, and only 7.5 percent provide more than $500
per year. Of the nation's 1,127 corporations whose assets
exceeded $0.5 billion in 1977, more than 80 percent made
contributions . . . [and] the total value of their
contributions constituted 50 percent of all corporate gifts.
As in most areas of corporate social and political activity,
discussion of corporate philanthropy is thus primarily a
consideration of the practices of large corporations.
Michael Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, 340, 340-41 (Walter W. Powell, ed. 1987).
111. A curious exception seems to be I.R.C. § 162(m), adopted in the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 3211(a), which prevents public
corporations from deducting certain executive compensation in excess of $1 million.
While it is possible to read this provision as a protection for shareholders from
overreaching management, the limitations and exceptions in the statute make it seem more
like a political placebo than true regulation of executive compensation.
112. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.

1997]

THE TAX TREATMENT OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

859

expenditures, 1 3 that inclusion itself supports the argument that charitable
giving is a normal corporate activity.
c.
The Tax-Expenditure Method of Government Subsidy is
Inconsistent with Concentration of Power in the Hands of Corporate
Management
A related stumbling block in the discussion of corporate philanthropy
within legal scholarship is the assumption that all charity is good, and
4 If that were so," 5 then
therefore, anything that supports it is desirable. 11
it could be argued that the conflict between managers and shareholders is
unimportant, because any corporate charity is better than none. But the
legal definition of charitable organizations is so broad" 6 that there is plenty
of room for shareholders to believe that some organizations, though within
113. See supra Part I.B.1.
114. This seems to have been the most common argument in favor of extending the
deduction to corporations. See 61 CONG. REC. 5,295 (1921) (House floor debate); 56
CONG. REC. 10,426-28 (1918) (House floor debate); H. R. REP. No. 1681, 74th Cong.,
Sess., reprintedin Seidman's Legislative History, 1938-1861, 286.
115. There are numerous problems with this position. For example, depending on
the elasticity of charitable giving, the deduction may be inefficient so that a dollar of tax
subsidy may not produce in excess of a dollar for the recipient organization. See CHARLES
T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICYAND CHARITABLE GIVING, 206-21 (1985) (reviewing
econometric studies of price elasticity of corporate giving). Even if elasticities are high,
the deduction may not necessarily be efficient because high elasticity is consistent with
waste. See Gergen, supra note 68, at 1439. Furthermore, corporate giving may reduce
individual giving. For analyses of crowding-out effects, see Burton N. Abrams & Mark
D. Schmitz, The Crowding Out Effect of Governmental Transfers on Private Charitable
Contributions, and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Do Government Grants to Charity Reduce
PrivteDonaions?,both in THE ECONOMCS OF NONPROFIT INYITUTIONS: STUDIES INSTRUCtURE
AND POLICY (S. Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
In addition, it is important to isolate the deduction for corporations from the separate
issues of charitable deductions for individuals and government support for charities.
Objections to the corporate deduction do not imply anything about these other issues, and
therefore, the corporate deduction requires independent normative justification.
116. The latest statistics show that there are approximately half a million nonprofit
charitable organizations that have been recognized by the Service as exempt under §
501(c)(3), which includes all of the following as exempt purposes: religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, educational, fostering sports competition, and
preventing cruelty to children or animals. While other classifications of organizations are
also eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations
receive the largest share. See Cecilia Hilgert, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt
Otgaizaions,1991, in INtERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BU..ErN 26 (1995).
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§ 501(c)(3), are distinctly bad." 7 The specific content of what is socially
desirable is bound to be a subject of much dispute, even if there is
agreement on the general
goal that corporations should act responsibly for
8
the good of society."
The methods by which a pluralistic society reaches consensus on any
particular social issue is a political matter of importance. "9 If corporations
operated by unanimous consent of all interested persons, or even like

democratic polities-with constitutional limits, mechanisms for separation
of power and meaningful suffrage-then the decisions of corporations on
moral issues might reflect some shared conception of the good. However,
the current structure and operation of corporations give no comfort that
decisions about what is good for society are decisions that any critical
mass of people with an interest in the corporation would believe are
good. 2 Reorienting corporate management toward the political sphere,
as suggested by Jeffrey Nesteruk,12 1 assigns too much weight to the social
preferences of the individuals holding those positions.
Furthermore, reorienting corporate management, and legitimating
greater power in management to carry out their own visions of the good,
is inconsistent with the policies embedded in the tax expenditure model for
funding charitable organizations. One justification for the charitable
contribution deduction is the promotion of pluralism. 122 By funding
charitable organizations through tax expenditures rather than direct
117. Shareholders may believe that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations are bad for
myriad reasons. For example, they may disagree with the purposes of an organization,
or believe that the organization is not worthy of a tax subsidy because it does not produce
as much social good as cost. Mark Gergen has recognized this issue by stating that the
existence of people who are "radically disinterested" prevent the charitable contribution
deduction from being a Pareto improvement. Gergen, supra note 68, at 1412.
118. Of course, there is not agreement as to whether corporations should act for the
good of society. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is
to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
119. Polities must make decisions of a moral character. See Jeffrey Nesteruk,
Corporations,Shareholders, and Moral Choice: A New Perspective on CorporateSocial
Responsibility, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 451, 468-69 (1989); Kahn, supra note 14, at 63640.
120. See Allen, supra note 9, at 268-69.
121. See Nesteruk, supranote 119, at 467.
122. See Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2009-10 (1969) (statement of John D. Rockefeller
IH); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A
Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REv. 377, 392 (1972). For an
overview of the pluralism justification, as well as some of the economic models; see
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable OrganizationsInfluence Federal Tax Policy: 'RentSeeking' Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 971.
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government spending, individuals can implement their diverse views about
what is deserving of funding." 2 The tax expenditure method respects
eclectic individual values because it allows any goal favored by a small
minority of taxpayers 24 to get some amount of government funding,
regardless of the will of the majority."' The pluralism argument contends
that placing power over public funds (the subsidy to charitable giving that
the tax expenditure model treats as coming from foregone revenue) in the
hands of individuals who are willing to pay for part'2 6 of an organization's
work counteracts the tendencies of democratic institutions to take too
mainstream and narrow a view of the projects worthy of support.' 27
Significant indirect public support of endeavors through the charitable
contribution deduction, if accompanied by private funding, appears to lack
the stigma that attaches to direct public funding of controversial charitable
works that some consider distasteful. 2 ' It has been argued that the tax123. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of Charitable
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); William J. Turnier, PersonalDeductions
and Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1703, 1723
(1986).
124. Or even an individual, in the case of private foundations.
125. Milton Friedman has praised the market along similar lines, as a way for
individuals to make diverse choices. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15
(1962). But see McDaniel, supra note 122, at 390 (arguing that the charitable deduction
in its current form does not, in fact, promote pluralism because the upside-down nature
of the subsidy favors the wealthy).

126. Part because the charitable contribution deduction makes the government a copayer to the extent of the taxpayer's marginal rate. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, supranote 36 (quantifying the costs to government of foregone revenue for tax
expenditures).
127. Empirical evidence may prove the pluralism rationale to be flawed because
donors prefer to support large, prestigious organizations even more than does
government. This is certainly true of corporate donors. See Useem, supra note 110, at
342.
128. There was tremendous public debate about the National Endowment for the
Arts' support of a Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit that some considered obscene. See, e.g.,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Free Society Doesn't Dictate to Artists, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1990, at A31; William Safire, Stop Subsidizing The Arts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1990,
at A31. There was no suggestion that the institution that sponsored the exhibit should
lose its I.R.C. §501(c)(3) status, though it was indicted (and acquitted) on obscenity
charges. See Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum In Mapplethorpe
Obscenity Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1.
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expenditure model of funding charitable works
129 has been a necessary factor
in producing positive results in our society.
Against this defense of the charitable contribution deduction itself, one
must consider the effects of extending the deduction to corporations, and
most particularly, the desirability of centralizing power over the particular
charitable destination of public and private funds in large corporations,
which undermines the pluralistic goals of the deduction. 0 Even
increasing the input of individual shareholders into the corporate decisionmaking structure, or increasing the power of management to take
representative social positions, is at odds with the policy of disaggregation
of charitable decision-making and government funding of charitable works
that has justified the charitable deduction itself. If the government is a
poor institution for making choices about the public good, it seems that
large corporations are at least as bad;' 3 1 there is no reason to believe that
corporations are better at prioritizing different charitable purposes,
determining appropriate levels of support for diverse needs, or resisting
the temptation to support conventional tastes than either the government
or individuals. In addition, the concentration of charitable funding from
corporations inevitably leads to the exertion of power by those
corporations over the charitable institutions, 32 while the individual
33
deduction is more likely to produce small gifts that fail to buy influence. 1
129. It has encouraged "experimental people and dissenting voices [that] have to be
financed, at least in the early stages, out of a single financial pocket, or a very few."
John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the FederalTar System, in THE ECONOMICS
OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE AND POLICY 254 (S. RoseAckerman ed., 1986). Simon attributes discovery of the polio vaccine to a single $15,000
gift to Jonas Salk from the Scaife Foundation.
130. See Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1494 (1958)
(reviewing J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)) (noting that
corporate giving may conflict with pluralism); Engel, supranote 51, at 23 n.66 ("it seems
peculiar to perceive an increase in pluralism from anything that augments the power of
for-profit corporations in our social decisional process"). Employee matching grants
prevent this centralization of decision-making in management, and therefore, are more
consistent with the pluralistic policies of the charitable deduction.
131. But see Nesteruk, supra note 119, at 466-75 (arguing that corporate
management should make the choices of citizens that the shareholders of corporations
resemble since they are merely beneficiaries of the corporation, rather than owners or
investors).
132. See Engel, supra note 51, at 63.
133. Of course, rich individuals are crucial sources of support for many exempt
organizations, and their large gifts influence the organizations as well. John Simon has
argued that this anti-democratic aspect of the charitable contribution deduction is
acceptable because it advances important social goals. See Simon, supra note 129, at
249-52 (applying a Rawlsian analysis to the upside-down subsidy).
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In sum, the real-entity theory of the corporation can support the
expansive corporate deduction of § 170, but only on the most
anthropomorphic interpretation of the corporate entity. While any entity
notion can support the economic underpinning of the charitable deduction,
which requires that the corporation give away its money without receiving
anything in return, only an entity with human characteristics can act by
virtue of its own generosity. 134 The anthropomorphic conception of the
corporation is an inadequate model for the Code because it fails to
appreciate the differences between human persons and corporate persons.
Ethical theorists have largely resisted, and generally, the Code has rejected
the notion of an anthropomorphic corporation. The differences between
humans and corporations demand that the corporate charitable deduction
be justified, independent of the individual deduction, taking into account
the special nature of the corporation and the unique issues that arise in
corporate giving.
The limited-entity conception of the corporation, which recognizes that
corporate persons are not interchangeable with human persons, is too weak
to explain the corporate charitable deduction because it fails to include
profit-reducing philanthropy within the legitimate sphere of corporate
activity. Therefore, a tax system built on that conception would have a
more limited notion of taxable income and allowable deductions, and
would have no place for a deduction for philanthropy not connected to
corporate purposes.
Furthermore, the limited-entity model of the corporation recognizes
internal conflicts and the significance of individuals within the corporate
sphere. By authorizing the corporate charitable deduction, without
addressing the special issues that are intertwined with the limited-entity
model, the Code has legitimated the power of management to make
charitable choices on behalf of the people involved in the corporate entity,
and has undermined the pluralistic values embedded in the deduction for
individuals.
This legitimation is dangerous from an agency-cost
perspective, but more importantly, from the perspective of concentrating
political power in corporate management over the destination of public
funds, which is inimical to both the democratic process and the policies
underlying the tax-expenditure model for charitable giving.

134. Any version of the real-entity theory, which allows a corporation to have its

own income, supports the corporate charitable contribution if the deduction allowance
requires only that the donor make a payment without receiving a quid pro quo.
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II. THE NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS CHALLENGE TO THE TAX LAW'S
TREATMENT OF CORPORATE GIVING

The nexus-of-contracts approach treats the corporation as a connecting
point for the actions of individuals in their various capacities of
production. The participants in the firm are part of a web of relationships
in which no group is privileged as a matter of structure, and the rights and
obligations of the various participants are governed by markets that affect
and largely define their interests.'3 5 Within the understandings or contracts
that arise from these markets, some terms are expressly 'negotiated, some
dictated by either managers or investors and negotiated as to price, others
fixed and accepted at the market price, and others implied by courts or
legislatures choosing36terms that would have been chosen if people had
addressed the issue.'

Within the most radical reading, the contractualized corporation ceases
to exist as a separate institution at all.' 37 A less radical interpretation of
the theory, but still consistent with the nexus-of-contracts approach, treats
the corporation as an institution that can be a contracting party.' 38
However, unlike in the real-entity theory, the corporation can never be
treated as an anthropomorphic being, but remains solely the product of
39 the
aggregated market-based understandings of the constituent parties.'
A. The Corporationas an Aggregate
The crucial element of the nexus-of-contracts model for application to
the tax law is the aggregate conception of the corporation. If the Code
135.

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 10-11, 16-17, 39, 258 (1991).
136. See id. at 14. See also Kornhauser, supra note 27, at 1451 ("the nexus of
contracts approach constructs an agreement out of the interests of the relevant parties")
(emphasis in original).
137. See Phillips, supranote 2, at 1061-62 (describing the ascendancy of the nexusof-contracts approach and the decline of the real-entity theory of the corporation).
Philosophical underpinnings for this approach can be found in the work of J.W.N.
Watkins, proponent of "methodological individualism." See MAY, supranote 77, at 14-17
(discussing methodological individualism).
138. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985).
139. Although I have tried to distinguish the anthropomorphic entity, the limited
entity and nexus-of-contracts entity from one another for ease of discussion, the different
conceptions of the corporation are not so clearly delineated. The corporate entity that
exists as a contracting party is along a continuum with the more robust conceptions of the
corporate entity discussed in Part I.
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were to contemplate the corporation as an aggregate of contracting parties,
then the tax treatment of corporate philanthropy would have to be
reconsidered, and could be redefined in terms consistent with the Code's
general framework for taxing corporations and charitable giving.14°
In contrast with the anthropomorphic model necessary for the Code's
charitable deduction for corporations, the nexus-of-contracts approach to
the corporation has generally been thought to support the idea that
corporations cannot act as independent moral persons.' 4' This position
does not necessarily imply that philanthropy is illegitimate as a matter of
corporate governance within the model. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel, strong proponents of the corporate-contract model, have argued
that corporate philanthropy should generally be a matter for contracting,
like other terms, but that "[flor most firms the expectation is that the
residual risk bearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run
profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock." 4 2
However, it is possible that corporate philanthropy is justifiable under the
as a term that forms part of the bargain
nexus-of-contracts approach,
43
defining the corporation.
140. While the aggregate notion of the corporation may support integration of the
corporate and individual tax, this essay does not consider that possibility and integration
is beyond the scope of this discussion. This essay identifies corporate giving as a special
problem for an aggregate conception of the corporation, even if complete integration is
not a necessary corollary of the aggregate approach. Reconceptualizing the corporation
as an aggregate for tax purposes can be consistent with a separate corporate tax if, for
example, the separation of ownership and control in the corporation is significant for tax
purposes, or if the corporate tax is a second-best wealth tax. The corporate tax could also
be used to reduce agency costs in the nexus-of-contracts model. See Lily Kahng,

Resurrecting the General Utilities Doctrine (manuscript on file with author).
141. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 27, at 311; Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1273 (1982).
142. EASTERBROOK &FISCHEL, supranote 135, at 39. Professor Brudney has pointed
out the empirical problems with the nexus-of-contracts approach generally, and the lack
of actual or implicit consent of the contracting parties. See Brudney, supra note 138, at
1405-06, 1414-15. Models of contracting depend on information, and the failure of the
securities laws to require disclosure of corporate philanthropy may undermine any
contractual argument concerning corporate giving. See Kahn, supranote 14, at 605 n.99.
143. See Millon, supranote 2, at 236-37. Although the nexus-of-contracts approach
has generally been used to support the notion of a shareholder-centered corporation, and
the pivotal role of profit maximization, those conclusions do not necessarily follow from
the model. The aggregate conception can also support a broader picture of contracting
parties that includes employees, creditors, customers and even the community at large.
Therefore, there is no clear prescription about corporate philanthropy that necessarily
grows out of the conception of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, and the nexus-ofcontracts approach is indeterminate in legitimating corporate philanthropy in general.
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tax treatment of corporate giving to be consistent with the nexus-ofcontracts theory, the tax law should account for that giving as a contractual
term for which some participant in the venture bargained and paid. In
keeping with this approach, the deduction for corporate philanthropy might
better attach to the contracting parties who act charitably, rather than the
corporation itself. If corporate philanthropy is the carrying out of
individual philanthropy through the corporate nexus, then income and
deductions might better flow to the individual. 4 Thus, where corporate
giving as a wealth-reducing term for the shareholders is properly priced
in the market as a term of the corporate contract,146 the nexus-of-contracts
approach applied to tax theory suggests the possibility that the corporation
may not be the proper taxpayer to claim a deduction for corporate
giving."4 If the corporation is not the proper taxpayer, then from the
perspective of taxpayers, there are people who are overtaxed or undertaxed
by assigning the deduction at the corporate level, 48 and, more

Similarly, no clear prescription for corporate giving follows as a necessary attribute
of the real-entity model of the corporation. See Berle-Dodd debate, discussed supra note
109 and accompanying text; Millon, supra note 2, at 248.
144. The indeterminate nature of normative content in theories of the corporation
was argued by John Dewey in 1926. See generally John Dewey, The Historical
Background of CorporateLegal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926). Dewey's article
may have been responsible for the sudden end of debate on the issue, and some scholars
disagree with his conclusions. See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 175.
145. Some commentators have recognized that corporate contributions may be
substitutes for individual giving by shareholders or managers. See Knauer, supra note
49, at 45-48; Davis, supra note 101, at 13-15, 65-67.
The IRS has adopted the constructive dividend model for charitable giving only in
cases in which significant benefits are received by shareholders of closely held
corporations. See Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125.
146. This is not necessarily an accurate description of reality. See Brudney, supra
note 138.
147. If the market price of the stock and managerial compensation are affected by
corporate philanthropy, then the price adjustments may also reflect capitalization of the
tax savings of that philanthropy. It may not, however, due to the indeterminate incidence
of the corporate tax.
148. Because of the uncertain incidence of the corporate tax, it is arguable that the
corporation is never the proper taxpayer because it is impossible to allocate the tax burden
among individuals through the corporate tax. If, however, corporations are to continue
to be taxpayers, as this essay assumes, then there must be some assignment of income and
deductions to the corporation that best measures the nexus-of-contracts corporation's net
income. In that context, there can be a misallocation of income and deductions to a
corporation. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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significantly, from the perspective of the fisc, there may be a net
undercollection or overcollection of total tax.' 49
Conceiving the corporation as an aggregate of contracting parties
demands identification of the individual interests served by the corporate
action. The theory allows the characterization of corporate giving as a
product of contracting between shareholders and managers, or broader
constituencies, and can represent explicitly delegated authority to
management or decision-making reserved to other groups."° In using the
nexus-of-contracts approach as an analytical tool that locates corporate
philanthropy as individual moral choices,' 5' one must ask what contract
would have been entered into freely, with sufficient knowledge of material
facts. 5 2
The nexus-of-contracts approach suggests that corporate
philanthropy be parsed out as the product of individual charitable intent
carried out through the corporate nexus.
B. Adjusting the Model to Allow Charity
Application of the nexus-of-contracts approach here neither endorses
it as a positive or normative theory, nor criticizes it. The purpose of this
application is to suggest an alternative approach that the tax law can take
to the question of deductions for corporate philanthropy. With this
purpose in mind, it is necessary to modify some elements of the
neoclassical version of the nexus-of-contracts model to make it more
conducive to an analysis of charitable giving.
Writers in the neoclassical economic tradition assume that the
contracting parties are rational economic actors, maximizing value for
themselves,' and living in a Hobbesian world.' In this vision of human
149. The corporation's ability to deduct what is actually a dividend reduces the tax
base.
150. For example, Berkshire Hathaway allows its shareholders to exercise power
over individual philanthropic choices. See Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of
the Board, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to Shareholders (Sept. 15, 1995) (on file with
author). Employee matching grant programs give the same power to employees.
151. The assumption that contracting parties are "rationally ignorant" is problematic.

See Alan Wolfe, The Modem Corporation:PrivateAgent or PublicActor?, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. RaV. 1673, 1685 (1993).
152. This uses the contract idea in the tradition of John Rawls, as a way to evaluate
arrangements, rather than to describe them as actual contracts, as Easterbrook and Fischel
do. See RAWIS, supranote 93; Wolfe, supranote 151, at 1680; EASTERBROOKAND FISCHEL,
supra note 135, at 16 (arguing that, unlike the social contract, the corporate contract is
real). Because there is no required disclosure of corporate philanthropy, it is hard to see

how the market accounts for it. See Kahn, supra note 14.
153. See Bratton, The Nexus of Contracts Corporation,supra note 2, at 417.
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nature, there is no room for welfare-reducing altruism that allows charity,
in the sense described here, to exist. 55 The neoclassical model does not
account for the non-utility maximizing acts of the individual contracting
parties.' 56 Because real human beings have the capacity to be charitable,'and because the contracting model is being applied here in order to

identify the individual inputs that produce corporate philanthropy, that
58

aspect of human nature must be part of the analysis of philanthropy.'
In analyzing the corporation as an aggregate, there is no compelling
reason to limit the contracting parties to single-minded profit-maximizers.
Indeed, one of the virtues of the nexus-of-contracts approach is that it
permits a more complex understanding of the choices and motives of

actors within the corporation. Individuals, who retain the capacity for

human emotion even as they become part of institutions, 159 can cause those
institutions to carry out their welfare-reducing wishes.
C. Who Is Charitable When a CorporationEngages in Philanthropy?
The task then becomes identifying the individuals for whom the
corporation carries out philanthropic activities. If the contracting parties
include the charitable organizations themselves and the community-at154. See Wolfe, supranote 151, at 1687 ("The literature spawned by the economic
theory of the firm clearly is individualistic, but what is more important is the kind of
individuals it envisions. These individuals are not people as most of liberal political
theory has always understood them.").
155. See Sen, supra note 67. Any charitable acts would have to be recharacterized
as welfare increasing on some reciprocal-expectation model. See Wolfe, supra note 151,
at 1682 ("The notion that what seems to be altruism is really self-interest is a way of
arguing that what seems to be real is not really real at all -- hardly a position compatible
with taking the world as it is.").
156. See Bratton, The Nexus of Contracts Corporation,supra note 2, at 417.

157. See KRISTIN

RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF

(1996) (explaining altruism as an empirical phenomenon).
158. An "institutional" version of nexus-of-contracts allows for broader human traits,
and is therefore a more appropriate model for considering philanthropy. See Bratton, The
Nexus of Contracts Corporation, supra note 2, at 421 (referring to the work of Oliver
Williamson as embodying the institutionalist approach).
Alan Wolfe, a sociologist and political scientist, has argued that the pure
contractarian theorists do not allow for actual individual decision-making and that the
individuals in their models are "not responsible selves in the way many liberal theorists
imagined human beings." Wolfe, supra note 151, at 1685. See also Brudney, supra
note 138, at 1405-06, 1414-15.
159. Daniel Fischel has acknowledged that human beings do have moral obligations
and social responsibilities, even as he argues that the corporation cannot. See Fischel,
supra note 141.
A COMMON HUMANITY

1997]

THE TAX TREATMENT OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

869

large, then identifying actions with constituencies becomes difficult, and

regulating the contracting becomes impossible. Corporate law has never
had the ambitious agenda of regulating all the relationships implicated by

corporate activity, 16' and the tax law is even more limited as a potential
moderator of corporate activity because it can regulate only by adjusting

its subsidy for charitable giving.
In keeping with the Code's requirements for a charitable deduction,

it makes sense to limit the relevant contracting parties to persons who can
fulfill the requirements for charitable giving:

charitable

intent and

economic burden. 161 That means that the relevant parties include only
individuals who are capable of acting generously, and who may also bear
the ultimate financial burden for corporate giving in the pricing
adjustments that the nexus-of-contracts model assumes the markets can

make. The choices seem to be shareholders, employees, and managers.'

62

1. Shareholders
The shareholders are the most obvious choice for the people whose
generous impulses and financial resources may produce corporate

philanthropy.

On the simplest analysis, corporate philanthropy is the

giving away of the shareholders' money. 163 One premise of corporate law

160. "If... one is also concerned about consumers or the general public, to redraw
the boundary of the corporation broadly enough to encompass these constituencies
threatens to dissolve the line between the corporation and the rest of the world. The
normative implications are then ambiguous." Millon, supra note 2, at 259.
161. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. In United States v. American
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986), the Supreme Court adopted the following
standard: "First, the payment is deductible only if and to the extent it exceeds the market
value of the benefit received. Second, the excess payment must be 'made with the
intention of making a gift.'" (quoting Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105).
162. Absent from the analysis that follows are consumers. While it has been
suggested that customers bear the economic burden of corporate social responsibility that
does not inure to the benefit of the business, the shift to customers depends upon an
increase in the marginal cost of products. See Engel, supra note 51, at 25. This can
readily happen with socially responsible corporate activity related to its business, such as
pollution control, but is unlikely to happen with respect to corporate philanthropy.
163. While the government subsidizes corporate giving by allowing the corporation
to take a tax deduction, the deduction is not an incentive that is costless for the
shareholders. If the applicable corporate-tax rate is 35 %, then the corporation is out-ofpocket 65 cents for every dollar contributed to charity. While greater tax subsidies are
available for the contribution of appreciated property, see I.R.C. § 170(e), current
empirical research shows that corporations predominantly give cash to charity. See
Useem, supra note 110, at 341. Gifts of cash are only tax-favored to the extent of the
donor's marginal rate.
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is that shareholders are entitled to the residual profits of the corporation
in return for the risks they assume, while managers, creditors, and
employees are entitled to fixed returns for their inputs."6 Therefore, the
financial burden of corporate contributions is on the shareholders to the
extent of the non-tax-subsidized portion. 6 ' This is so because the
assumption that the expenditure is not income-producing means that costs
cannot be shifted from holders of the residual interest in the corporation
to other participants in the corporate venture. If the expenditure is not
income producing, then it must come out of the earnings of the
corporation, which represents the shareholders' residual return on
capital. 6' 6
As for the portion financed by the tax subsidy, the deduction provides
an economic benefit to whomever bears the corporate tax, and the tax
savings may not benefit the same persons who are burdened by the out-ofpocket cost of the contribution. If the tax-subsidy from the government
alleviates a tax burden on equity holders, it reduces the cost of the
charitable contribution for them."6 If, however, the corporate tax is borne
by people other than shareholders, then the deduction for charitable giving
produces a tax reduction for those people, and can be seen as a wealth
transfer from shareholders, who bear the burden of the philanthropic
donation, to the group that benefits from the deduction.
2. Employees
Another potentially generous constituency, which may cause the
corporation to give on its behalf, is the corporate workforce. Consider
employee matching-grant programs: both requirements for deductible
giving-cost and intent-attach to the employees in that case. The
economic cost of corporate giving falls on the employees, in keeping with
the nexus-of-contracts model, when the contribution of corporate funds to
164. See Brudney, supra note 138, at 1436; EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note
135, at 10-11.
165. The non-tax-subsidized portion is the actual out-of-pocket cost of a charitable
contribution, while the tax-subsidized portion is the cost that is financed through tax
savings.
166. If the contribution is income-producing, then it becomes a cost of the
corporation similar to all other business costs, and can have various real incidences, or
economic burdens, depending on how the market adjusts to the costs.
167. Economists have not been able to pinpoint the incidence of the corporate tax

because the market may adjust in various ways so that the tax is either borne by holders
of capital, or shifted to labor or consumers, or some combination. See MUSGRAVE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 32, at 269; see generally JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, BROOKINGS
INST., WHO PAID THE TAxEs 1968-1985 (1985).
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the objects of the employees' affections is priced in the market as a fringe
benefit to the employees of the corporation. The nexus-of-contracts model
of the corporation implies that this method of corporate giving is taken
into account in the market for employee wages. 6
Matching grant
programs are reasonably seen as employee fringe benefits because
directing funds to the employee's favorite charity is a benefit to the
employee similar to other non-cash benefits, such as health insurance, that
cost the corporation money and would otherwise have to be purchased by
the employee with cash. The tax law clearly recognizes the compensatory
equivalence of fringe benefits and ordinary salary by generally taxing
fringe benefits like cash compensation. 69 In the contract model, matchinggrant programs are one of the perquisites of employment, which might
have been traded in the bargaining process (actual or implied) for more
direct employee compensation.
3. Managers
A narrower group of people for whom corporate contributions may
represent additional compensation is the managers. While the bargaining
process looks different for managers than for employees, the
characterization for tax purposes is essentially the same. Managers who
retain the prerogative to use corporate funds to enrich the charities they
favor are garnering the corporate profits for the objects of their affection,
and therefore, are receiving a benefit in the nature of extra compensation.
Whether this amount is termed an "agency cost," as the literature does
when managers take perquisites for themselves instead of maximizing firm
value, 70 or simply part of the negotiated fringe-benefit package of
168. The corporate-contract model accounts for implicit, as well as explicit,
contracting because markets price the implicit terms of the corporate governance contract.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 135, at 17.

Of course, it is possible that the market fails to account for employee matching
grants as a type of fringe benefit, in which case the economic burden of the matchinggrant program remains on the shareholders because they would otherwise be entitled to
the residual profits of the firm. From a corporate governance perspective, the allocation
of control to employees over shareholder funds is problematic because the corporate
workforce has an even more tenuous agency relationship with the shareholders than the
elected management. From a tax perspective, it is less troublesome. See infranotes 18184 and accompanying text.
169. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1). There are explicit exceptions from the general rule of
taxability of all fringe benefits. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 106, 119, 125, 127, 129, 132.
170. See Jenson & Meckling, supra note 27, at 308-10.
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management 7' that leads to a reduction in other salary paid, the
arrangement clearly mirrors that of the employees.
4. Identifying the Donor
A practical problem that follows from disaggregating the corporation
is choosing the various contracting parties accurately, particularly if tax
consequences to individuals are to follow from those choices. This is not
a significant problem if applying corporate theory to the Code is intended
to illuminate biases and provide perspective, as this essay suggests, rather
than to direct specific statutory changes.
In the case of corporate philanthropy, it might be hard to determine
on which constituency's behalf the corporation gives. Nevertheless, it
seems reasonable to impute certain contributions to certain constituencies
depending on some formal requirements for corporate giving.
Corporations can clearly identify particular charitable contributions with
employees through matching grant programs, and therefore, employees
should not be the identified donors in other cases. Similarly, Berkshire
Hathaway has demonstrated that shareholder designation is possible, and
shareholders should be treated as the donors through those programs.
Short of shareholder designation, it would be reasonable to treat corporate
giving as shareholder giving only if choices about corporate giving are
made through an effective mechanism for shareholder democracy.
However, it is hard to imagine a widely held corporation, under the
current proxy system, achieving that goal.
Since the most recent evidence suggests that corporate giving is
managerialism 172 and because treating it as such in the default case might
produce the greatest reduction in agency costs and the least concentration
of political power in the hands of corporate management, it would be
reasonable to treat the managers as the donors wherever the other
explanations are inapposite. Of course, where corporate giving is, in fact,
profit-maximizing for the corporation, then it need not be characterized as
charitable giving at all.
D. Recharacterizing CorporatePhilanthropyfor Tax Purposes
This analysis is a challenge to the tax law because it suggests that the
charity for which the Code allows a deduction may be identified with
171. Management compensation can come in a wide variety of forms. Some have
argued that the fruits of insider trading should be treated as managerial compensation.
See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REv. 857, 870-73 (1983); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 135, at 258.
172. See Boatsman & Gupta, supra note 50.
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various taxpayers other than the corporation.
Once the aggregate
conception of the corporation underlying the nexus-of-contracts model is
introduced, the idea of a generous corporate entity becomes impossible.
If managers are generous with the shareholders' money, then there is no
single taxpayer who makes a charitable gift that merits the deduction. One
response to this observation might be that the charitable deduction for
corporate philanthropy is simply indefensible and should be repealed so
that corporate philanthropy ceases to be tax-subsidized. But the aggregate
conception of the corporation does not necessarily lead to that conclusion;
it is possible to search for generosity and cost, in the tax sense, 73
somewhere in the aggregate.
The very limited conception of the corporate entity within the nexusof-contracts notion undermines the legal and theoretical predicates for the
existence of corporate philanthropy except as an extension of the charitable
impulses of contracting parties. 1 The choice of the corporate taxpayer
for allowance of the deduction, as opposed to the individual taxpayers, is
therefore not an obvious one, and instead of requiring repeal of the
deduction, the aggregate model may disperse the tax consequences away
from the entity to the individuals.
1. Allocation of Income and Deductions
If the Code were to follow through with the recharacterization of
corporate philanthropy as the projected generosity of individuals described
above, then the deduction for corporations under § 170 would be
inappropriate. By repealing the deduction at the corporate level, the Code
would become more internally consistent with its own presumption that
corporations incur expenses only in the production of income, and there
173. From a tax perspective, cost depends on the inclusion of an amount in income.
Therefore, a taxpayer can incur a cost based on amounts she never has in hand, if those
amounts have been taxed to her. For example, an employee has "tax cost" for the full
fair-market value when she purchases her employer's stock for less than that value and
includes the discount in income. See I.R.C. § 83. For an explanation of the special
concept of "cost" inthe tax law, see MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
A GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 13 (7th ed. 1994).
174. Corporate income may still exist because the nexus of contracts may coalesce
around corporate business. Nevertheless, the nexus-of-contracts conception of the
corporation can clearly be used to argue for integration of the corporate and individual

income taxes.
175. See supra Part I.B.1.
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would be no need to fit corporations
into a deductibility provision that only
176
comfortably suits individuals.
At the same time, the incentive and subsidy in current law for
corporate giving would not be abolished by a reconfiguration of the
corporate deduction because individuals would still be entitled to deduct
the charitable gifts made by corporations on their behalf. For tax
purposes, the various corporate constituencies, in keeping with the
aggregate approach to the corporation, could be treated as having income
and deductions more consistent with the corporate-contract model than
reflected in current law. 177
176. Courts have recognized that the intent requirement is problematic for
corporations, and the inclusion of corporations in the statute has led some courts to
question the intent requirement. See United States v. Transamerica, 392 F.2d 522, 524
(9th Cir. 1968).
177. Aside from the question of who should be entitled to the deduction for
charitable giving from corporate coffers, the aggregate paradigm presents a challenge to
the availability of any charitable deduction in some cases of corporate philanthropy.
Wherever the two requirements of charitable giving-generous impulse and economic
burden-are separated from one another because different taxpayers satisfy each of the
requirements, it may be more appropriate to disallow any deduction, rather than to assign
the deduction to one taxpayer who fails to fully satisfy the requirements. One example
of such separation may be in the context of cause-related marketing, in which a
corporation promises to give some part of the proceeds from the sale of a product to
charity. If the price of the product does not change as a result of the charitable gift, the
consumer bears no economic burden for the gift. However, the consumer may be
induced to purchase the product because of the diversion of funds from the corporate
coffers to the charity, so the consumer may be acting out of charitable impulses in
entering into the transaction. At the same time, the shareholders may suffer some loss
of residual profits by the payment of the promised percentage to the charity, and
therefore, the promotion may cost the shareholders money. However, the arrangement
is likely to have been devised as a promotion that would produce greater profits for the
corporation (by inducing consumers to buy the product), so any loss occasioned by the
transfer to charity cannot be characterized as motivated by charitable impulses of either
the shareholders or the managers. Because of the immediate advertising value of causerelated marketing, it is easy for corporations to fit such costs within I.R.C. § 162.
Separation of charitable intent from economic burden is an unresolved (and
unrecognized) issue outside the corporate context as well. In a recent private ruling, the
Service held that credit-card holders would be entitled to charitable-contribution
deductions for percentages of their credit-card purchases that were destined for charitable
organizations pursuant to arrangements with the credit card companies. See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 96-23-035 (March 8, 1996). These cards present a questionable case for the
identity of the taxpayer, as well as the general availability of any deduction. The cardholder has control over who receives the funds, but hardly acts with charitable intent
when simply purchasing items with a credit card. In addition, the card-holder does not
pay any extra for the goods by virtue of using the card-cash or noncharitable credit cards
would produce the same price for goods, so the cardholder bears no economic burden for
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Where gifts are made on behalf of shareholders, the Code would treat
the gifts as distributions paid to the shareholders from the corporation,
followed by charitable gifts by those shareholders. This makes sense
because the residual profits of the corporation, when paid directly to the
favorite charities of the shareholders, are indistinguishable from
shareholder contributions paid out of dividend funds.
Such a
characterization would produce taxable income to the individual
shareholders, 78 offset by a charitable contribution deduction.' 7 9 The major
difference from current law that this recharacterization would produce
would be the taxation of the corporation, which would no longer be
entitled to a deduction because distributions to shareholders, as opposed
to charitable contributions, are not deductible by corporations. 8 '
In the case of matching gifts made on behalf of employees, the gifts
would be included by the employees as compensation income,' offset by
the gift. The economic burden may be borne by the shopkeepers, who agree to accept
this card, rather than requiring cash, to induce consumers to shop at their store. That's
a profit-seeking motivation. On the other hand, if shopkeepers pay the same percentage
to this credit card company as to other companies whose cards they accept, then the
shopkeepers don't even bear any economic burden for the transfers to charity. Finally,
if the credit card company accepts less than the market requires because of the percentage
to charity, then one can argue that the credit card company bears the burden of the
charitable transfer. But, for them, this is simply cause-related marketing, which is
business, not charity.
178. See I.R.C. § 301.
179. This would produce a wash for the shareholders unless they exceed the statutory
limitations for charitable contributions of I.R.C. § 170(d), in which case the shareholders
would carry excess contributions over to a future taxable year. It is also possible that
some shareholders would receive no tax benefit from the deduction because they do not
itemize their deductions. This is a particular problem for employees. See infra notes
192-94 and accompanying text.
180. See I.R.C. § 311. Contrary to this analysis, in the private letter ruling that was
apparently issued to Berkshire Hathaway, the Service stated that shareholder-designated
contributions would be deductible by the corporation under I.R.C. § 170, and not taxed
to the shareholders. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-52-094 (Sept. 30, 1981).
181. See I.R.C. § 61. It is conceivable that Congress would want to provide an
exclusion, as it has for so many other fringe benefits that do not personally enrich
employees with cash, particularly in light of the fact that most rank and file employees
are likely to claim the standard deduction and would therefore have income with no
offsetting deduction. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 119 (exclusion for meals on the business
premises that are provided for the convenience of the employer), § 132(c) (exclusion for
certain employee discounts on products ordinarily offered for sale in employer's
business).
Statutory exclusion of employee matching grants from income, particularly in the
context of the general disaggregation scheme described here, would create a bias towards
corporate philanthropy in that form. While there are some advantages to the matching
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charitable contribution deductions."n The gifts would also be deductible
to the corporation as compensation expense,' 83 rather than a charitable
contribution. Assuming that the employees can benefit from the charitable
contribution deduction," 8 this produces the same result as current law
because there is a net deduction at the corporate level and no tax
consequences at the employee level.
From a tax perspective, gifts on behalf of management employees are
indistinguishable from gifts on behalf of other employees. Therefore, they
could be taxed the same as employee matching grants, i.e., producing a
compensation deduction for the corporation, and an income inclusion and
charitable deduction for the managers. Such a recharacterization would
likely produce some tax burden for managers, who would be subject to the
limitations on charitable contributions in § 170 and, as high-income
taxpayers, some disallowance for itemized deductions under § 68. This
allocation of income and deduction for managers follows the aggregate
model in deconstructing the corporate transaction into its constituent parts,
finding the individual and producing tax cost for the deduction by
requiring an income inclusion.
Alternatively, the nexus-of-contracts approach might support
distinguishing managerial compensation from employee compensation
because of that model's concern with minimizing agency costs, a concern
with respect to management, but not with respect to the regular work
force. If application of the nexus-of-contracts approach to the Code means
that the Code should be used as an agency-cost reduction tool, then where
corporate philanthropy is managerialism, the corporate deduction should
be disallowed without any tax consequences to the individual managers. 8 5
This treatment cuts off the tax subsidy that current law provides for
corporate philanthropy and alters the trade-off calculation that managers
grant model in terms of pluralism and dissipation of managerial power, if the employees
are giving away the shareholders' money, the matching grant model offers little
improvement over the managerialist model. Tax cost fails to create economic cost. I am
indebted to Jill Fisch for this observation.
182. The tax consequences to the individual employees would therefore mirror the
consequences to the shareholders.
183. See I.R.C. § 162.
184. Under current law, this is a big if because the charitable contribution deduction
is currently allowed only to taxpayers who itemize their deductions. See I.R.C. § 63.
From 1982 until 1986, non-itemizers were entitled to claim a deduction for charitable
contributions. See former I.R.C. § 63(b), repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514 § 102(a).

185. I am indebted to Lily Kahng for this idea.
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must make between contributions and profits, making contributions less
attractive. "'
2. Advantages of Recharacterization
Numerous advantages would flow from these recharacterizations of
corporate philanthropy as individual philanthropy. First, by explicitly
assigning charitable giving to shareholders, corporate management would
have to acknowledge the economic burden that corporate contributions
place on shareholders.
This tax treatment could lead to greater
accountability to shareholders with respect to corporate giving.' 8 7 At the
very least, the tax reporting requirements that would be necessary to
accurately tax the shareholders would mean that shareholders be informed
about the philanthropic choices made by management on behalf of the
corporation. The requirement that corporations provide information could
lead to more shareholder input in philanthropic choices,18 8 or at least better
monitoring of management abuse in charitable giving. 89
Second, this recharacterization would neutralize the bias of current law
that favors charitable giving at the corporate level, as opposed to the
shareholder level. As mentioned above, because of the structure of the
classical system of taxation, which taxes corporate income at both the
corporate and shareholder levels, the corporate deduction makes charitable
giving at the corporate level more attractive than distributions to
shareholders followed by charitable giving at the individual level.' 9°
Recharacterization removes the extra tax incentive to give at the corporate
level, compared to the shareholder level, which could lead to greater actual
186. In a world in which charitable contributions of corporations are deductible and
the marginal rate of tax paid by corporations is 35%, managers must decide whether to
trade the utility of $1 of charitable contribution for $0.65 of profit for the corporation.
If the corporate-level deduction is abolished, then utility-maximizing managers will have

less incentive to substitute contributions for profits. See Boatsman & Gupta, supra note
50, at 197 (relying on OLIvER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1967)).

187. Of course, it might also lead to less corporate giving. This essay takes no
position about a desirable level of corporate philanthropy.
188. It could lead to the adoption of programs similar to Berkshire Hathaway's.
According to that company's controller, administration of the shareholder-designated
contributions program is not burdensome. Telephone Interview of Julie Min and Dan
Jaksich (July 30, 1996). In 1995, Berkshire-Hathaway gave over $11 million to 3,600
charities. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1996).

189. See Kahn, supranote 14, at 624-25.
190. See supranote 103 and accompanying text.
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distributions and more individual shareholder determination concerning
charitable giving.' 9'

Third,

with

respect

to

employee

matching

grants,

this

92
recharacterization will highlight the upside-down nature of the subsidy'
provided by the charitable contribution deduction generally, 93
' and possibly
induce Congress to return to a more generous deduction for non-itemizing
taxpayers.' 94 Under current law, because the corporation deducts
employee matching grants, rather than the employees themselves,
nondeductible charitable giving of lower income people is minimized.
Finally, with respect to managerial compensation, both suggested tax
treatments would reduce the agency costs of management. Treating
corporate giving just like managerial compensation would make the agency
costs of managerial discretion explicit, 95 and would include those costs in
taxable income. To the extent that corporate giving is a managerial
perquisite, it should be taxed to management, and subject to the limitations

191. Of course, it would also reduce the total tax subsidy for private giving because
there would be an increased tax at the corporate level. But the reduced subsidy for

private giving would then be available for direct public support of charities.
192. The charitable-contribution deduction is an "upside-down" subsidy because it
provides a greater government subsidy for charitable giving of taxpayers in higher tax
brackets than lower tax brackets. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES 103 (1986). Some have challenged the significance of the upside-down
subsidy. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of PersonalDeductions in the Income Tax,
40 HASTINGs L.J. 343, 355 (1989) (disputing that the proper comparison between
taxpayers is absolute amounts of tax paid, and arguing that relative amounts of tax paid
and after-tax distribution of income are better ways to evaluate deduction provisions).
193. The corporate deduction might not be in the nature of an upside-down subsidy,
depending upon the incidence of the corporate tax. See supranote 167 and accompanying
text.
194. Under current law, taxpayers who choose the standard deduction may not claim
any deduction for charitable contributions that they make. See supra note 184.
Therefore, tax subsidies for charitable giving depend not only on whether taxpayers make
contributions to charitable causes, but also on completely irrelevant factors such as
whether they also incur home-mortgage interest. This is so because the aggregate of all
itemized deductions must exceed the standard deduction in order for the taxpayer to
itemize. Any policy justification for subsidizing charitable giving is compromised when
arbitrary factors determine whether a taxpayer benefits from tax savings as a result of
charitable giving. See McDaniel, supranote 122, at 384.
195. See Kahn, supra note 14, at 620-25.
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on individual contributions 9 6 and managerial compensation 97 found in the
Code.
Taxing such items as compensation and disclosing these
expenditures as managerial compensation would reduce the incentive of
managers to direct corporate assets toward themselves in this manner. On
the other hand, disallowance of any deduction at the corporate level might
more effectively reduce agency costs of management. However, it would
also impose a unique tax on corporate giving on behalf of managers,
compared to corporate giving on behalf of other employees and individual
giving of managers.
3. Conclusion
This essay has attempted to expose the problems presented by the
charitable contribution deduction for corporations in light of various
theoretical models of the corporation. It has argued that the deduction for
corporations cannot be justified by analogy to the deduction for
individuals. The proposal to allocate the deduction for corporate giving
in response to the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation is not
necessarily a proposal for legislative action. Instead, it is intended to help
inform the debate about the corporate charitable contribution, and to
consider the deduction in light of developments in corporate theory, while
assuming that the Code will continue to adhere to the classical system of
taxation.
Even if charitable giving is the province of individuals and not
corporations, we may still believe in the corporate-level deduction as a
matter of social policy. After this symposium, I plan to continue
exploring the corporate contribution deduction and to consider whether it
is possible to: (1) reconcile a tax policy that includes a corporate tax and
a corporate policy that values minimizing agency costs; and (2) resolve
conflicting directives of tax and corporate policy analysis where they
overlap.

196. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1) limits deductibility of individual contributions to 50% of a
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. While this limitation is not currently significant for

most taxpayers, it might be if corporate contributions were recharacterized in this context.
197. Such as the requirement that salaries be reasonable, in I.R.C. § 162(a)(1), and
the $1 million limitation of I.R.C. § 162(m).

